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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MARTON W. M.ALMSTR·OM,
Plaintiff and Appellant

Case No.
10110

vs.

THERON

c.

0 LSEN,
1

Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
THERON C. OLSEN
STATE·MENT OF ·CASE

The appelllant has appealed from the decision
of the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., Judge, Third
Judicial District Court, dismissing the appellant's
n1alpractice action against the respondent.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The appellant brought the ins~tant actio .n
against the respondent, a chiropractor,. cl\aiming she
sustained injuries as a result of treatment negligently rendered by the respondent. Mter presentation of the appellant's case, the trial c'ourt granted
the respondent's motion to dismiss ruling that appellant had failed to present a prim·a facie case.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON A'PPEAL
Respondent submits the trial court's action
shou'ld be affirmed.
STATE'MENT OF FAC'TS
The respondent submits the followin'g statement
of facts:
On January 31, 1962, the appellant filed suit
against the respon·dent, a duly licensed chiropractor offering services in Salt Lake 'County, alleging
thlat as a result of negligent treatment, she had
received from the respondent, she has sustained injuries to her neck (R-1). After several amended
complaints had been filed (R-12, 27), the matter
came on for jury tri al on February 2·5, 26, 19 64,
before 'Ray Van Cott, Jr., Judge, presi'ding. After
presentation of the plaintiff's ~ase, the trial court,
upon motion of respondent, granted a dismissal,
finding:
1

1

"* * * th·at there was no evidence that he
[reS'pondent] had failed to exercise the skill
and care commensur1ate with accepted standards of chiropractic treatment in Salt Lake
and vicinity." (R-36)
The evidence 1disclosed th'at the appellant was
a mature woman, 38 years old at the time of the
tr~atment, was a surgical nurse at the L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake City, had been a nurse since 1945,
and was ~a registered nurse with a bachelor of scien·ce degree in nursing education (R-4·3, 44, 80).
2
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On June 11, 1961, the appellant went to the office
of the respondent at his home in S'alt Lake County
afuar having been referred by a Dr. Poulter, another
chiropractor from Ogden ( R-45) . The appellant had
bflen suffering with low back pain since 1H49 (R-45)
and had previously consulte'd chiropractors concerning her condition (R-85, 91).
The appellant advised the respondent of her
condition an:d the referral and indicated th1at Dr.
Poulter had X-rays of her spine which were available (R-46). The re'Spon'dent proceeded to treat the
appellant by back man~ipul'ations. According to respondent, the following occurred (R.-4'7):

"A Yes. He had me take of my outer
garments and put on a gown that he had and
went into this room and he had 'a couch of
some kind, or ta'ble, whatever it was, that he
had me l~ay down on my ~abdomen. And he ran
hi's hands up and down the back and pressed
some way. I was on my 'abdomen and couldn't
see him, just what I was feeling, and pressed
on my back and somehow and -

Q

Wh~at

part of your back?

A The lower back where I was having
my difficulty. And then he had me on my
abdomen with my ~ace to the side and m'ade
a few motions with my head and took both
hands and gave it a very rough jerk.

Q What feelings did you have at that

time?
A

Well, it certainly hurt.
3
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Q Did you say anything to the Doctor

about it hurting?
A

Oh, I said, 'ouch.'
Q What else ·did he do?
A That was all. He was very brief.
Then when the treatment was over I got
dressed and my husband paid him and we
left."
T'he next day, the appellant went, with her
husb,and, to the M'ain Street office of the respondent for another treatment (R-48). Her testimony
in thaJt respect was ·( R-49) :
''A Well, I went into a room and removed my outer garments .again and put on
a gown. Anld I went into a room and he had
quite a low couch with a head up by a door.
And he again manipulated my spine. But before he did this my husband told him that he
had injured my neck, or that he had hurt my
neck the day before when he treated me and
he said, ''Oh, I can fix that.' And he was in
a big hurry and he said - just a moment.
There were people around anld went out the
door for awhile and then he came back and
he gave my neck another rough jerk adjustment an'd that was the extent of the treatment."
The respondent asked her to return again, however, the appellant did not do so (R-49, 50). Thereafter, the appell1ant went on vacation for nine days
during which time she did not consult a physician
and the pain she claimed to have sustained from the
trea tmen~t subside'd partially ( R-92) .
1

4
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Subsequently, the appellant consulted Dr. Argyle, an 1\'l.D. an·d general practitioner, who gave
her heat, clithermy treatments (R-'51-52). Therafter,
on July 12, 1961, she consulted Dr. Thomas E.
Baurnan, an orthopedic surgeon who prescribed
slt\t\ping in traction and \finally hospitalization for
traction ( R-52-55). 'The appelliant there~after was
referred to Dr. D. ·c. Bern1son, who di·agnosed a
ruptured or herniated disc in the upper back and
neck area (R-128, 129). A spinal fusion of this area
\Vas performed. Prior to the spinal fusion appellant
gavP the followin·g statement con~erning her medical
history to a Dr. Dawkins (R-87, 88):

"* * * '... This '38 year old female who is empoyed in surgery at this hospital states that
she knows of n'o incidence of twisting her
neck, although she has h~ad several incidents
of moderate trauma to the neck approxim!a:tely one or two months ·ago, she has pain in the
neck which sin·ce has been associated with p·ain
an d ·a feeling of pins an·d needles in the whole
arm and occasional areas of numbness which
iny·olve only the rigHt fifth finger and fourth
finger . . .' * * *"
.
In another medical report; the following appears ( R-88) :
1

"* * * 'PRESENT ILLNESS: Approximately 7 to 8 weeks prior to admission, the p'atient
was experien·cing a recurrent attack of her
lumbosacrta..l and s~iatic p·ain and while attempting to obtain some relief from these
symptoms she rtULde a careless slip which resulted ·in an acc~tte neck strain.' * * *"
5
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'The first operation was only partially successful, !and a second fusion became necess·ary which
was done on March 12, 19'62 ( R-6 2). On July 23,
1962, the appellant returned to work (R-64).
1

1

At the time of trial, the ·appellant testified that
during her treatment by other chiropractors, she
had had a similar form of treaJtment to th at given
by the respondent ( R-91 ) . This was confirmed by
the appellant's husband who testified (R-113, 114):
1

"Q H·ad you seen manipulations like
that before?
''A I had seen similar ones.
"Q By other chiropr!actors, I suppose?
"A Yes."
The appellant primarily relied upon the testimony of two medical doctors. Both doctors were
the tre·atin~g physicians. ·The tri·al court refused to
allow Dr. D. C. 'Bernson to testify as to the standard
of care in this case, as to whether the treatment in
this case was bad practice. The ·doctor had no knowledge a s to whether the treatment rendered was in
accordan·ce with proper chiropractic standards. He
testified ( R-144) :
1

"A No sir. What I said is referring 'to 'their
knowledge. I said I don't ~have the same knowledge, because I think I h!ave 'a great deal more
knnw ledge th·an chiropractors. I am not an
authority on chiropractic treatm·ent, sir.
"THE COURT: And the methods they
u~se?

6
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.. ~\

No, I am not.
''Q And whether or not the one method
used by one would be good or not, is that
correct?
''A That would be correct.
"THE COUR·T: In other words, if Dr.
Olsen did one thing you wouldn't know from
the standpoint of chiropractics an'd procedure
\Vhether or not it w.as correct or incorrect?
"A

Not on their standards, sir."

Doctor Bernson did testify that it was "possible'' that discs could be ruptured by a sharp movernent of the neck (R-130), ·an~d that from his analysis, the rupture was "recent", but did not say
how recent. Doctor B~aum1an also testified that a
chiropractic neck manuipulation "could cause the
condition" (R-158). Doctor Bauman also unfamiliar with proper chiropractic standards in the community (R-161). He further 'testifield that the herniation could be caused by some trauma in everyday
activity (R-165). No evidence that the trea;tment
given here was ·contrary to accepted chiropractic
standards was offered.
The trial court dismissed, and commented in
part (R-200) :
''So that there is no evidence here that this
Doctor did use excessive force ·and if he dtd
use excessive force there is no evidence th·at
the kind of treatment that he gave ·her on 'that
occasion was not the kind of treaJtment that
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was standard by chiropractors in this community and may have had a bad resullt with
any other chiropractor.
"'So that, as I say, there is nothing here in
the way of expert medical testimony to show
that the thin'g that Dr. Olsen di'd was not standard and he is to be judged as a chiropractor,
not as a neurosurgeon or an orthopedic surgeon. They concedingly have greater skill or
greater knowledge than the ·chiropractors. But
chiroprac~ors are lawfully pra'Cticing their
profession and manipulatiion of the spine and
of the back as a part of their lawful practice
an'd which they have a right to do.
"There is no evidence that he wasn't doing
that except that he had a bad result and we
do not say there is negligence because an accident happened. I go out here on the street
and h~ave an accident in an automobile, but
it is no sign that I was negligent because I
had an accident, nor would it be a sign if you
di d."
Based on the above facts, it is submitted the
trial court ruled correctly.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRikL CO·URT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
'THE TESTIMONY OF DOCTORS BAUMAN AND
B'E,RNSON W·OULD NOT SUFFICE TO S'HOW THE
.NPPROPRIATE STAN·DA'RD OF CARE.

In the in'Stant case, the appell!ant contends that
the 'testimony of Doctors ·B:auman and B'ernson
sh)ould be sufficient to establish the negligence of
8
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the l'Pspondent. This contention simply will not
stand. Neither Doctor Bauman nor Doctor Bernson
indicated they were familiar wi1th the stand'ards of
practice of chiropractics (R-144, 178). Therefore,
neither Doctor could say whether the actions of the
respondent were contrary to accepted standards of
rhit·opractic practice in the community. There is no
evidence in this case that the respondent in !anyway
~ought to treat the appellant other than as a chiroprartol'. Therefor, can the testimony of the Doctors
establ'ish the standard of care where by their own
adn1issiuns they were unfamili'ar wilth the appropriatP standards of chiropractic treatment? Obviously not. The trial court refused to allow the doctors
to testify as to whether the treatment given was bad
practice. It is submitted that appell'ant's contention that the tesltimony of Doctors Bernson an·d
Bauman establishes the appropriate standard and
shows negligence fails on two bases : ( 1) There is
no testimony of record of abandonment of proper
standards, an·d (2) since the Doctors were unfamiliar with proper standards, their testimony could
not establish negligence.
1

In Forrest v. Eason, 123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d
178 ( 1953), the plaintiff sued a naturopathic physician for m~lpractice. The trial ·court grante:d a
directed verdict. On appeal, this Court affirm·ed
noting:
.,,,Thether defendant was licensed to practice
minor surgery is not clear, but 'immaterial
9
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here. The record does not indicate the plaintiff sustained the burden of provin·g defendant
negl~gent. A ~laintiff, unable to rely on any
res Ipsa loquitur theory, must prove negligence in a case allegedly involving malpra·ctice. Civil liability does not depen·d necessarily
on lack of statutory licensing qualification,
but rather upon failure to exercise that degree of care an·d skill considere·d proper by
correct and accepted standards of the professiun involved, or, stated otherwi~se, failure to
use ~that care exercised by skille·d professional men doing like work in the vicinity."
The 'Court, therefore, recognized thalt there must be
some evi'den'ce of the required standards of care
before a plaintiff may recover. In this instance, no
evidence of the required standards was received by
the trial court. The su'bstance of the testimony of
the two medical doctors was as to their treatment
and diagnosis of the appellant. They were not allowed to testify as to wheth·er the actions in this
case constituted a departure from accepte'd prac..
tice of the chiropractic school. Indeed one of the
Doctors indicated 'he would be unable to testify as
to whether the treatment was proper because he
could not divorce himself from his more specialized
learning ( R-178). 'The appell'ant ·does not, by this
appeal, contest the evidenti!ary ruling of the Court.!
'1 In Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 9·2 Utah 312, 3'32, 67 P.2d 654 (1937),
this !Coun-t, citing Martin 'V. Courtney, 75 Minn. 255, 77 NW 813,
implied the m·atter of admitting such testimony is exclusively for
the trial court.

10
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Therefore, the testimony of the two Doctors factually fails to show a departure from proper stand'ards.
Secondly, where the Doctors were in fact unfanliliar with accepted standards of chiropradtic
treatment, it would be ludicrous to contend their
tP~timony could show negli'gence. It is, of course, recognized that a medical doctor must pass ex·aminations ..generally required of candidates for the degree of doctor of medicine by reputable medical
colleges in the United States." 58-12-12, U.C.A.,
1953, and tllat for th·ose who practice without dru~gs
or sur~;ery, a similar exam must be passed excepting ~'materi~a medi'ca, therapeutics, surgery, obsltetrics and theory and practice." 58-12-13, U.C.A.
1953. However, this does not mean that the law
does not recognize the fact that various schools of
n1edicine do differ. A chiropractor in fact does practice a \'"arying form of treatment than !an osteopath
or allopathic physician. This 'being so, the stan'dard
of care to be ·applied is that of the chiropractor, or
other school of practice. Forrest v. Eason, 12'3 Utah
610, 261 P.2d 178 ( 1953) ; Abos v. 1Vlartyn, 31 C'al.
i\.pp. '2d 705, 88 P.2d 797 ( 19'39) ; Howe v. McCoy,
113 Cal. App. 468, 298 Pac. 530 ( 19'31). Thus, in 19
.-\.L.R. 2d 1198, It is stated:
"Generally, a 'drugless practitioner or healer
is entitled to have his treatment of his patient tested by the rules and principles of the
school or system to which he belongs."
11
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Some courts have refused to allow physicians
to testify as to the standard of care applicable to a
chiropractor. Sheppard v. Firth, 215 'Ore. 268, 334
P.2d 190 (19·59); J,anssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183,
205 N.W. 159 (1925). In Bry~ant v. Biggs, 331 Mich.
64, 49 N.W. 2d 63 (19'51), 'The Michigan Supreme
c·ourt noted as to a physician's testimony against
an osteopath:
1

"In view of the repeated statements that he
h ad no knowledge of osteopathy or the methods or standards of practice generally of osteopathic practictioners, the conclusion necessarily follows that he was not competent to
testify whether the defendant exercised due
and ·proper care . . ."
'See Anno. 85 A.L.R. 2d 1022.
1

However, in this case, the record is 'Completeiy
absent ~of eviden·ce as to the proper standard of care
because of lack of knowledge and an ina;l)ility of
one doctor to divorce himself from his specialized
training. T~he trial court was, therefore, clearly correct in its determination that there was no evidence
from the testimony of the physici ans to show reS'pondent departed from the proper 'Standarld of care.
T~he Doctors simply did not know anything about
medicine by spine manipulation.
1

W~alkenhorst

v. Kesler, supra, cited by appellant, does not assist on this questi on since there the
testimony of the physician was a·dmitted, and secondly, the Court noted:
1

12
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"* • * The evidence submitted to the jury
'vas sufficient to s·how appellant stepped out
of the 'chiropractic' field when limited to palpation, an'd the testimony in tfue light of the
statute was admissible because appellant was
charged with having diagn'osed and treated
human ·ailments."
This is not the case in the instant appeal, n~or
did the Walkenhorst case involve a situation where
the doctor, although unknowledgeable in chiropractics, indicated he could not testify as to the standard because he could not divorce himself from his
more specialized knowledge n~ot required of chiropractors.2 Therefore, ~he case is inapropos in this
instance.
It follows, therefore, the 'appellant cannot argue
\vith any success that the testimony of Doctors
Bauman ·and Bernson estaJblished the stan·dard of
this case and a departure therefrom.

0~

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW NEGlLIGENCE
THE PART OF THE RESPONDENT.

The appellant, in Point I of her brief, argues
that the evidence received ~by the Court establishes
negligence on the part of the respondent. In orlder
2 :r~ree defects. in Justice Moffat's opini'On and the reason why
op1n1on of Justices Wolfe and Folland may be more persuasive
m the future is ( 1) the majority never determined what was encompassed by "materia 1nedica, thereapeuties, surg~ry, obstetrics
and theory and practice" so that standards ·where applicable were
n~ver defined, (2) that a person is legally qualified is substantially
drfferent than actual knowledge, and ( 3) the legislature never intended the registration law to determine tort liability (see Forrest
v. Eason, supra).
~he

13
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for the plaintiff to recover in a malpractice action
.
'
It is necessary for the proof to show (1) the appropriate standard of medical treatment for the school
of practice invdlved, and ( 2) 'a departure from these
standards.
There mere fact of injury or an unsuccessful
result will not support a finding of negligence. In
Ritter v. Sivils, 206 Ore. 410, 293 P.2d 211 (1956),
a malpractice action was brought against a chiropractor. The Court stated:
1

"A chiropractor is not a warrantor of cure,
an·d if a good result does not ensue from his
efforts the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
not ·available to his erst while patient."
The Utah Supreme Court has followed this
standard in me dical practitioner cases in the past.
The concept of res ipsa locquitur is not applicable
to medical ·ma1 practice cases in Utah. Forrest v.
Eason, 123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178 (1953); Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1H3'7);
Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, ·2 P.2d 2:57 (1931).
Affirm~ative evidence must be offered by showing
(1) what the recognized medical standards are in
the community; ('2) a departure from those stan..
dards due to neglect; ('3) damage as the proximate
result of such departure. Utah has adopte(} the position th,at proof of medical standards, and neglect
in not maintaining those standards, as well as proximate cause must be shown by expert testimony.
1

1
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Thus, in Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139
P.2d '216 (l!l -l:i), the UtaJh Supreme Court stated:
~'•

• • ,,.hat is the ordinary care and skill requirE)d of a doctor in the community in which
he serves n1ust necessarily depen'd upon expert tE.)stimony."
In 41larsh v. Pemberton, 10 U. 2d 40, 347 P.2d
1108 ( 19;-)~l), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
~'A

physician or surgeon is not an insurer of
a successful result and therefore no presumption of negligence is to be indulged from the
fact of an adverse result of his treatment or
operation on a patient. This court held in
Edwards v. Cl'ark:
'In order to recover in such case the
plaintiff must show that in trea'tment
of the patient the defendant physician
did not exercise such care and diligence
as is ordinarily exercised by skilled physicians doing the same type of work in
the vicinity, and ~hat the want or railure
of the required skill and care was the
cause of the injury complained of. :That
there might have ~been neglect or lack
of ski'll is not en'ough. To permit a ·cause
to go to the jury on testimony showing
only possilbility, or Wh'at might or could
have happened, is to permit 'a jury to base
a verdict upon conjecture, speculat1on or
suspicion.'
~'See also Baker v. Wycoff, 9'5 Utah 19'9, 79
P. 2d 77;
"Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.'2 d 257.
"The ordinary care and skill required of a
1

1
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doctor in the community in Which he serves
must necessarily be established by expert testimony. This court has held that expert testimony 'is unnecessary to establish liability in
malpractice cases only where the question of
propriety of treatment of a patient by a physician is a matter of comm'On knowledge of
laymen or when a p·hysici'an shows a gross
neglect or want of care and skill such as leavin'g medical supplies in the incision of a patient.
"This case does not fit any of the above exceptions. It is certainly not within the common knowledge of a laym'an as to how tight
a cast should be applied to a foot following
a 'triple arthrodesis' operation. Evidence was
introduced to the effect that the swelling accompanying su·ch an operation could be different with every in1 dividu~al; therefore the
ti'gh1tness of the cast and the amount of padding necessary is a matter of judgment exercised by the physician. A physician is generally liable for misjudgment only when he arrived at such judgment through fa'ilure to
use ordin!ary care and skill or was guilty of
misattention or neglect.
"In the absence of ·a standard of care establ1ised ·by expert medical testimony and some
evidence showing a deviation from this ~t~n
dard it must be presumed that the physiCI!ln
skillfully operated on and treated the plaintiff. To allow the question of negligence t~ be
submitted to the jury without first est.abhshing a standard of care would allow a JUry to
indulge in ·a type of speculation not generally
allowed.
16
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"This is neither the type of case that is within the con1mon knowledge of laymen nor can
it hl\ said that a standa1·d was established by
the testimony of the defendant physician.
Counsel for the plaintiff in attempting to establish a ~tanclarcl of care by the defendant's
testitnony posed several hypothetical questions
to the defendant asking 'him to assume facts
that \vere neYer proved. To submit the question of liability to the jury under such circumstances would be to ~base a verdict upon
a 1nere possibility of negligence. It is seldom
that a doctor's standard of care, 'because it is
so specialized, is known or is with in the knowledge of a layman. We believe this case to be
the type that required expert testimony as
to 'a standard of care and that the failure of
the plaintiff to call an expert medical witness
and establish such a standard was fatal to ·his
recovery.''
1

St.)l\

also Annotation 81 A.L.R. 2d 59'7.

The 'appellant, however, conten'ds that even
though there is no testimony showin'g a departure
fron1 acceptable standards of chiropractic treatment
that this case is one where the circumstances surrounding the claimed injury establish negligence in
the absence ·of expert testimony. The tri!al court
carefully considered this allegation as a·gainst the
situation in Baxter v. Snolv, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d
25i (1931), and determined that this case, like the
facts of Baxtet, will not support such a contention.
This Court, in Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385,
227 P.2d 772 (1951), did recognize that where the
17
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facts are such that ordinary laymen may find a
'departure from ·proper treatment, the case m'ay go
to the jury in the absence of expert testimony. That
case, however, involved the leaving of a surgical
sponge in the wound after a tonsillectomy. The
sponge cases, however, are a unique departure from
the general rule requirin'g expett testimony. McCoid,
Liability of Medical Pr,actitioners, Professional
_Negligence, p. 74 (1960). T·he appellant has cited
a few cases supporting a case of negli'gence against
chiropractors and other healing practitioners apparently on the basis of injury. However, the facts of
'those cases are substan'ti!ally more aggravate'd than
those now before the court. In Farrah v. Patton, 99
Colo. 41, S9 P.2d 76 (1936), the facts showed a
terrific snap form of manipulation of the patient's
neck by the osteopa:th followed by the onset of intense pain !and vomiting. 'The doctor himself admitted at the time that he had been "a little rough".
The patient was unable to swallow, and paralysis
on the right side of the patient's body occurred immediately. T·hi s is a substantially different situation
that is involved here. The appellant noticed only
sli'ght pain, which subsided subsequently while on
her vacation. The treatment of her spine and neck
was not ·couple'd with intense injury thereafter, nor
was there the "terrific" jerk, etc. which was involved in Farnah. In a m'ore recent case, the Color~do Supreme ~court noted 'that a '~terrific yank"
1
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i~

not enough to show negligent treatment. In Klimkielvic;; l'. Kar·nick, 372 P.2d 736 (Colo., 1962), the
Court stated:
"The plaintiff does not claim improper diagnosis ; she expressly admits that the technique
that defendant alleges he used as proper chiropractic treatn1ent and that the method which
demonstrated as that used was proper. Thus
\\.l) find that plain tiff's complaint is confined
to the fact that defen'dant gave 'her arm a
'tremendous yank'. This was part of the admitted 'proper chiropractic treatment'. In giving this 'tremendous yank' as related by plaintiff, or in applyin'g 'a mild firm extention ...
to the arm', as related by defendant - no
matter wHich version is correc't - the :defendant's actions were those of a doctor under
cont1·actural obligations, and the propriety
of the sa1ne must be measured by the rules
governing one in his position."
In Nelson v. Dahl, 174 Minn. 574, 219 N.W.
941 (1928), a chiropractor under spinal adjustments on a patient and during the course of treatment died. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
" '"rhen a doctor accepts ·professional employnlent, he is only required 'to exerci'se such
reasonable care an·d s'kill as is usually exercised by doctors in 'good standing of the same
school of prac'tice. When a patient selects one
of the several recognized schools of treatment,
he thereby adopts an·d accepts the kind of
treatment common to that school; and the
care, skill, and diligence with which he is
treated, when that becomes a question in the
courts of this state, must be tested by the evidence of those who are trained and 'Skilled in
19
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that particular school of treatment. In actions
of this character the plaintiff must show that
the result concerning which complaint is made
was due to negligence or unskiiful 'treatment.
In this case no negligence is 'shown. The fact
that the patient died soon after the adjustment is not significant. Negligence is not presumed from results. Appellant stres'ses the
failure to diagnose, 'to recognize the presence
of diseases by their symptoms, but the schuol
of the c'hiropractors seems to limit its field of
operation to the spine and 'to making 'the abnormal normal. It would seem that such could
seldom 'have harmful consequences. 'Those enga'ged in chiropractic treatments must, of
course, h·ave regard to the presence of such
ailments as might be aggravated by adjustments of 'the spine - if such adjustments do
in 'fact aggravate any .ailments. Plaintiff
sought a new trial upon the ground of newly
discovered eviden·ce which is directed to the
duty of a chiropractor to make a general examination of his patient before giving a treatmen1t . . . Such evi dence was apparently not
produced because counsel expe·cted to prove
thi's issue by an allopathic doctor, which was
not permissible. T'he moti'On was also addressed to the discretion of the trial court.' "
1

In the instant case, the facts show none of the
circumstan·ces that would bring this case under the
exception to the rule requiring expert evidence. This
case is not different from Baxter v. Snow, supra,
where this 'Court rejected such a contention. 3 The
3 For the s·ame reason, a'S well as the fact that expert testimony
as to standard was offered, Hinthorn v. Garrison, 108 Kan. 510, 196
Pac. 439 ( 1921) does not support the appellant.
1
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appellant went to the respondent suffering fron1
low back pain. She was a mature woman, famili,a r
with 1nedicine and chiropractics and educated as a
nurse. The treatment given her ;b y the respon·d ent
based on the testimony of her husband .a nd herself
\Vas similar to that given ·by other chiropractors.
The respondent did not purport to diagnose or go
outside the field of chiropractics. Although she notired pain du1·ing the treatments, it was not by her
own admission intense or excruciating. After the
treatn1ents, she wen't o·n vacation, ~and the discomfort subsided to some extent. Although the subsequent diagnoses by the testifyin·g physicians was
of ruptured or herniated discs, it was admitted that
other activities may cause such a problem. The practice of ch1ropractics involves m~anipulation of the
spine; Board of Medioal Ex.a miners v. Freenor, 47
Utah 430, 154 Pac. 941 (1'9'1'6 ); consequently, the
n1ere fact that the respondent made such manipulations cannot be evidence of negligence. 'T he amount
of force and propriety of treatment, in the absence
of clear eYidence of unprofessional conduct, is a
matter of judgment and expertise in the school and
expert evidence must define the area where judgnlent ends and negligence begins. Coon v. Shields, 88
Utah 76, 39 P.2d 348 ( 1934). The appellant contends that since the doctors testified a ruptured disc
could occur or was possible during chiropractic m~an
ipulation, that such when coupled with the evidence
makes out negligence. In Moore v. D. & R. G. W.
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R. R. Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 29'2 P.2d 849 (1956), an
expert testified that "it was possible" that the accident caused a ruptured inter-vertebral disc. The
Court 'hld that pl:aintiff ha'd failed to meet his burden. The Court stated:
". . . the plain tiff retains his burden of proving his ·damages by competent evidence to an
extent where 'the trier of fact might discover
that which is probably true, having regard
for the certainty or uncertainty which is more
or less inherent in every issue of fact.''
Certainly where the eviden·ce shows no departure from standards of reasonable practice, where
the appllant herself in reciting her medical history
discounts the very claim she sues on, the evidence
will not in any event support an award. The trial
court painstakingly considered the issue and review~d the evidence against the precedents after
viewing and hearing the testimony. An analysis of
the trial court's action, the evidence and the law
discloses no basis for reversal.
CONCLUSION

The appellant was given every reasonable latitude by the trial court to make right a case demonstrating the respondent's negligence. The simplest
and easiest way to have done so would have been to
call a witness from the same discipline as the respondent to testify relating to the appropriate standard
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of care and the claimed departure from reasonable
tt·eatrnent. The appellant instead attempted to reJy
upon allopathic physicians whose personal an'd proft.l~sional prejudices against chiropractors and druglP~s physicians are obvious. Further, the appellant
sought to rely upon the fact 'df injury itself to support her claims. Both of these tactics are unsupportable in law, and the evidence afforded the appellant
no basis for relief against the respondent. The trial
court correctly dismissed appellant's cause of action.
This Cout should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

HAN'S!ON & BALDWIN
Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
Theron C. Olsen
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